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MICHIGAN LAW

REVIEW

CARRIERS - COMMON CARRIERS - SEGREGATION OF RACES - DISCRIMINATION - Plaintiff, a negro, had purchased a railroad ticket entitling
him to :first class accommodations from Chicago, Illinois to Hot Springs, Arkansas. When the train entered Arkansas, the conductor, in purported compliance

1941]

RECENT DECISIONS

with an Arkansas statute requiring segregation of colored from white persons/forced plaintiff to leave the Pullman car and ride in the second-class car set
aside £or colored passengers. Plaintiff alleged that this car was not equipped
with the same conveniences which were provided for white passengers traveling
:first class, and he :filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission
claiming that he had been discriminated against in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act. The commission, in dismissing the complaint, found that in
view of the infrequent demand for Pullman accommodations by the colored
people, plaintiff was not unduly discriminated against by the action of the railroad. Plaintiff then brought suit in the district court to set aside the commission's order. That court dismissed the complaint. Appeal was then taken to
the United States Supreme Court. Held, order reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. The facts found by the commission established that plaintiff
had been unduly discriminated against, and such discrimination is forbidden
by section 3 ( l) of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 Mitchell v. United States,
(U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 873.
Statutes requiring that railroad companies provide separate accommodations
for the white and colored races are common in the southern states, and their
constitutionality has uniformly been recognized despite frequent attack under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The element of
discrimination by the statutes has been avoided by providing that the railroad
company must furnish equal facilities for both races, and the courts have followed the theory that segregation does not imply that one race is inferior to the
other. 4 The statutes themselves are justified as being an exercise of the police
power for the comfort and convenience of the traveling public. 5 In so far as
these statutes have been interpreted to apply only to intrastate commerce, they
have been held not to be repugnant to the commerce clause,6 but when attempts
have been made to extend their operation to interstate passengers, the courts
1

The state segregation statutes usually provide as an alternative to separate cars,
that one car may be used for both white and colored passengers if there is a solid partition separating them. Thus, by giving colored passengers drawing room accommodations at the same prices which are charged for regular compartments, the railroads
have been able to comply with the statutory requirements, and at the same time furnish sleeping car facilities to the small number of colored passengers who demand
them. On the occasion in question, however, the drawing room had been previously
assigned to white passengers.
2
"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this act ••• to subject any particular person ••. to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 24 Stat. L. 380 (1887) as amended
in 49 Stat. L. 607 (1935), 49 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 3 (1).
8
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69 (1914); Anderson v. Louisville &
N. R. R., (C. C. Ky. 1894) 62- F. 46.
4
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 551, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
5
Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566 (1898).
6
Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, IO S. Ct. 348 (1890);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. IOI (1900); South
Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 399, 40 S. Ct. 378 (1920).
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have held either that the statute is inapplicable,1 or that it is invalid as an attempt
upon the part of the state to regulate interstate commerce. 8 However, the question that more frequently arises is whether the carrier has, in complying with
the segregation requirement, violated that portion of the state statutes requiring
that equal accommodations be afforded white and colored passengers. When a
person has in fact been discriminated against by the action of the railroad company, he may prosecute the officials of the company under the penal provisions
of the statute,9 and seek damages at law.10 The plaintiff in the instant case, being
an interstate passenger, chose to seek a different remedy, however, in asking that
the Interstate Commerce Commission issue a cease and desist order against the
railroad under the Interstate Commerce Act. The commission has always interpreted section 3 (I) to the effect that it does not prevent the carrier from
segregating the two races as long as equal accommodations are furnished to
both.1 1. The Supreme Court of the United States has in the present case affirmed
that interpretation, and it is interesting to note that in so doing, it defined the
right to non-discriminatory treatment under section 3 (I) in the absolute language 0£ the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 :i Thus, when the rights of interstate
1
Carrey v. Spencer, (Sup. Ct. 1895) 36 N. Y. S. 886; Washington, B. & A.
Electric Ry. v. Waller, (App. D. C. 1923) 289 F. 598.
8
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 T,}. S. 485 (1877); Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 10 S. Ct. 348 (1890); Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 60 A.
457 (1905). But cf. Smith v. State, IOO Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566 (1898).
9
The statutes requiring segregation usually have a provision making it a misdemeanor for the railroad officials to fail to provide equal accommodations. Ark.
Stat. (Pope, 1937), §§ 1190, u98; Ala. Code (Michie, 1929), § 5350; Ga. Code
Ann. (1935), § 18-9901; Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1930), § 797.
I.o At the time that plaintiff in the present case filed his complaint before the
Interstate Commerce Commission he was maintaining an action for damages in Cook
County, Illinois.
n Councill v. Western & A. R. R., I I. C. C. 339 (1887); Heard v. Georgia
R. R., 1 I. C. C. 428 (1888); Edwards v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 12 I. C. C.
247 (1907); Cozart v. Southern Ry., 16 I. C. C. 226 (1909); Gaines v Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 16 I. C. C. 471 (1909); Crosby v. St. L.-S. F. Ry., 112 I. C. C.
239 (1926).
I.:? In the opinion in this case Chief Justice Hughes stated: "We take it that the
chief reason for. the Commission's action was the 'comparatively little colored traffic.'
But the comparative volume of traffic cannot justify the denial of a fundamental right
of equality of treatment, a right specifically safeguarded by the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act. We thought a similar argument with respect to volume
of traffic to be untenable in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. We said
that it made the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who may
be discriminated against, whereas the essence of that right is that it is a personal
one. • •• While the supply of particular facilities may be conditioned upon there being
a reasonable demand therefor, if the facilities are provided, substantial equality of
treatment of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual, we said, who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws,-not merely a
group of individuals, or a body of persons according to their numbers." 6 I S. Ct. at
878. Compare this language to that in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S.
337 at 350, 59 S. Ct. 232 (1938), a case involving the right of a negro to enter a
state university law school which was maintained for white students alone.
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passengers are involved, the burden is placed directly upon the railroad. It must
either abandon its policy of segregation or bear the risk of having to furnish
separate and equal accommodations at a considerable loss.

John C. Johnston

